Weight - Evidence - Family Report - Expert Report - Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Weight to be Drawn
Evidence
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Family Report
Expert Report
[A] Weight to be drawn from Medical Reporting; Family Report Writer; Evidence
General Position (WA) - Parenting Matters: "31. Division 12A of Part VII of the Act and its equivalent in the Family Court Act 1997 (WA) provide that in parenting proceedings, unless the Court makes a specific order to the contrary, certain aspects of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (and the Evidence Act 1906 (WA)) do not apply. In particular, relevant to this case, they are provisions relating to hearsay and opinion evidence. It is clear in this case that her Honour did not exclude the operation of Division 12A and therefore she was not bound by the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) nor the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) and was entitled to admit evidence that was based on hearsay or was otherwise opinion evidence. 32. But in a case in which there were allegations which were contested it would have been helpful, in my view, for the Magistrate to have set out which of those matters she gave weight to and which she did not consider. But as I have said, I do not need to deal with that matter further.": Moszkowski & Moszkowski [2010] FamCAFC 249.
Unchallenged evidence: "The husband’s evidence has been accepted as unchallenged. Unchallenged but admissible evidence still requires a court’s determination as to its weight. Here, there was nothing implausible about the husband’s evidence. In addition, this is not a jurisdiction in which orders are made on a default basis. The husband was required to prove his case on the balance of probabilities (s 40(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)). In respect of such things as the values of assets, the husband produced admissible and accepted expert evidence.": Tillman & Tillman [2016] FamCA 14, [25].
Participation in assessment was compromised, expert did not account for her disability: "36. I am asked to find that the mother’s participation in the assessment was compromised. Having heard from the Single Expert I was concerned about the weight that I can place on her evidence for the following reasons: (a) The mother tendered a report provided by a disability service provider in 2021. It had been provided to the Single Expert (as an annexure to the mother’s material) but not read by her before the interview. It observed that even using aids, the mother experiences comprehension difficulties. For example, “it may take her longer to absorb [...] information, which may result in her needing repeats and/or the confirmation of [...] information. [...]” and then further on, it recommended that the mother: has access to [accommodations], particularly in [...] situations that require extended periods of listening. [Ms Vinogradov] is likely to experience increased cognitive load and [...] fatigue [over] extended periods of time [...]. (Annexure [MV]-01 of the mother’s affidavit) (b) The Single Expert’s interview with the mother went for 2.5 hours and was followed by a 45 minute observation of the mother’s interaction with X. The same amount of time was allowed to the father for both the interview and observations. (c) It appears that the Single Expert gave no thought to additional measures that might have been required for the mother, once she became aware of her disability. Instead, she concluded at paragraph 56 of her Report that, “[...] she was able to communicate without any major issues”. (d) No consideration was given by the Single Expert to reasonable adjustments that could have been made to the interview or assessment process to ensure there was no distortion in the test results arising from her disability. For example, in light of the report tendered by the mother, extra time might have been given to the mother to process questions asked, or another accommodation provided (as occurred for every Court event). This was confirmed under cross-examination: [COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER:] You don’t say in your report, for example, that you took more regular breaks than you might otherwise have taken, did you? [SINGLE EXPERT:] No, I didn’t. But I also didn’t – they weren’t requested. ... [COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER:] You didn’t, for example, do something like send the mother written questions prior to or after the assessment? [SINGLE EXPERT:] The mother provided logical responses ... and she also said that she could understand, so I – I don’t know ... why I, well, needed to. (Transcript 10 May 2024, p. 324 lines 21-30) (e) The Single Expert described some of the mother’s responses as “vague” and described her thought processes as “disorganised”. Despite attributing these labels to her, her Report gives no indication of the impact of the mother’s disability on her presentation. (f) The Single Expert administered psychometric tests. In her Report she discloses that the “Personality Assessment Inventory”, used for evaluating personality and psychopathology, is recommended to take “50 – 60 minutes” to administer. (g) The Single Expert observed that “[t]he Family Strengths and Needs Assessment Tool assesses parents and caregivers based on significant psychological and psychosocial risk factors”. What is not made clear is what, if any, impact the mother’s disability has on the assessment of psychosocial risk factors. (h) The Single Expert made the following comments in relation to the validity of the test results: Validity of Test Results The PAI provides a number of validity indices that are designed to provide an assessment of factors that could distort the results of testing. Such factors could include failure to complete test items properly, carelessness, reading difficulties, confusion, exaggeration, malingering, or defensiveness. For this protocol, the number of uncompleted items is within acceptable limits. There was no evidence to suggest that the mother was generally motivated to portray herself as being relatively free of common shortcomings or minor faults or in a more negative or pathological light than the clinical picture would warrant. (Single Expert Report, paragraphs 79-80; emphasis in original) (i) Another question that then arises is whether any adjustments might have been required to the particular tests administered, having regard for the mother’s disability. When this was tested in cross-examination the Single Expert was defensive and appeared unable to concede that the mother’s disability may have affected her responses in any way. For example: [COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER:] Well, could it be that the problem is with the question? ... [SINGLE EXPERT:] I’ve written hundreds of ... I ask this question of everyone. So if you would like to question all my reports, please do. (Transcript 10 May 2024, p.333 lines 4-6) ... 39. But when it comes to her overall recommendations, I am more cautious. It is possible that the test results provided an accurate reflection of matters such as parental risk factors. Taken alone, her personal views about health care in the USA might be excluded. But given the significant concerns raised with both the process she adopted and the conclusions and recommendations she reached, only limited weight should be placed on most aspects of the Report and especially its conclusions.": Vinogradov & Traversi [2024] FedCFamC2F 1770, [36], [39].
Admissions, police record: "Given the father’s admitted substance abuse history, and noting that there is no reason for the police to have inserted that admission if the father did not make it as no charges arose, I accept that although prima facie hearsay, it is likely that the police record of the father’s concession should be given weight, and that the father was back on a prohibited substance as recently as mid-2022, the month before the Trial.": Mitchell & Boyle (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1F 798, [204].
One-sided assessment based made on mother's self-reporting, no weight given to that evidence: "The Mother now relies on the affidavit of Dr EE, which annexes a coercive control risk assessment administered by her. However, I give no weight to that evidence because it is apparent that Dr EE’s views are based on a one-sided assessment made on the Mother’s self- reporting.[41] Essentially, Dr EE accepted everything the Mother reported in answer to questions posed in the risk assessment. She did not receive any information from the Father and did not have the benefit of considering Judge Dunkley’s finding of fact, that there had been limited, transient, historical, verbal denigration of the Mother by the Father. Although I accept that Dr EE has considerable experience in researching family violence, there is no evidence about her education or qualifications that permit me to be satisfied that she meets the criteria to give expert evidence,[42] which is plainly what she purports to do. Further, Dr EE’s views lack the true independence of a single expert who is usually appointed under the Court rules, and she does not state that she is aware of the duties of an expert witness in this Court.": Gounelle & Crozier (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC2F 282, [39]-[41].
Where the single expert engaged in a fact finding exercise contrary to his role: "162. The single expert’s “identification of key issues requiring resolution” were beyond his brief in that he: Identified that it was his view that “facilitating the re-establishment of the full realisation of the father-son relationship between [Mr Pembroke] and the subject child [X] is the primary issue here requiring resolution.” [73] This was the foundation on which the report was projected. It does not accord with the mandatory legislative considerations. Opined that no grounds were provided to suggest that X is at any plausible risk of harm from unsupervised contact or overnight care with the father or any individual associated with him. This is the role of the fact finder, not the single expert. It was also expressed prior to the backpack incident. Further recorded that he took it upon himself to “strongly encourage” the parties during the course of their individual interviews to seek to resolve this dispute through FDR rather than through expensive litigation. 163. For the above reasons, the weight I place on the single expert’s written report and recommendations is reduced. 164. The single expert first gave oral evidence by arrangement between the parties prior to any witnesses, including the parties, giving oral evidence. He was then re-called subsequent to the parties’ and their supporting witnesses giving evidence. Prior to his giving oral evidence the single expert had been provided with further material from the parties by way of joint correspondence from the Independent Children’s Lawyer dated 27 November 2024 which included the parties trial affidavits.[74] On the morning of the trial, the single expert also received a bundle of documents from EE Centre; being therapy notes which he scanned quickly. He indicated at the commencement of his cross-examination that he had received a volume of material in excess of 500 pages. 165. At this time the single expert’s opinion and recommendations were broadly that:- On the proviso that the therapy has defined goals and treatment pathways, and awards for meeting those goals, that the parties and X continue family therapy with Dr DD. On the proviso that the therapist is informed of some of the complexities of the matter, that the mother keep working with her therapist (noting that the mother in her oral evidence said that she would commit to keep working with the therapist to make her a better parent). It would be “most constructive” if the father undertook similar individual therapy. An order be made that neither party physically discipline X as sought by the Independent Children’s Lawyer. Ultimately, if the court was to weigh the merits of a 6/8 formulation versus a 7/7 formulation, then “that symbolic notion – and obviously, implemented in reality of both parents being seen and treated as equals in [X]’s eyes – may be of considerable benefit in this particular matter.” [75]. 166. The single expert’s opinion and recommendations were grounded on factual assumptions and extended beyond his purview of expertise. For this and the reasons recorded above I do not place significant weight on his recommendations. The single expert’s opinion will be further considered later in these reasons.": Pembroke & Dewitt (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2F 191, [162]-[166].
Family Report Writer:
> "The Court is not bound by the opinions of the family report writer. However, where the foundation for the report is solid and consistent with many of the findings the Court has made, then the Court is entitled to give significant weight to the views and opinions of the report writer. In this case, I do so.": Abramsson & Abramsson (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 912, [94].
> "The report of Ms C, regrettably, was only released some few days before the hearing and did not contain any clear or specific recommendations. That is not a criticism. It is not the role of the report writer to determine the outcome of the proceedings. But the report has a number of deficiencies which largely relate to systematic problems. The children, the subject of these proceedings, [X] and [Y], were not seen with the applicants notwithstanding that their application was to have these children live with them in their full-time care. Within the report substantial criticisms were raised by the applicants, Mr and Mrs Thompson, of the mother and when Ms Dean was then seen subsequently with the children, it would appear from the flavour of that report, that very little testing, or reality testing, of the allegations and criticisms raised by Mr and Mrs Thompson was undertaken, if any. As a consequence, recommendations were made in the report, not with respect to the children’s future parenting arrangements, but as follows: a) Department of Community Services be urgently requested to commission a full comprehensive family report in the matter, and b) That pending Department of Community Services intervention the current orders be enforced and the children spend regular time with their grandmother. The difficulty with those recommendations is that the Department is not a party to these proceedings and I have no power to compel them to do anything. Secondly, and more fundamentally, Ms C was commissioned to prepare the family report and why it is then recommended at the conclusion of a 27-page document that a State Government agency be seized with that very responsibility beggar’s belief. It is also inferred that Department of Community Services would be invited to intervene in these proceedings. Whether that would or would not have been fulfilled is unclear, although, based on the material that is available in the affidavits it would appear unlikely that the Department would intervene as they have had substantial and repeated complaints, it would seem, not only by Ms Thompson, but substantially by her, and Ms Thompson expresses her disappointment, including to Ms C that the Department has, in her words, “done nothing”. One can infer from that that perhaps the Department did not have any concerns that they felt they needed to act upon. In addition to the reports, Ms Dean has also been cross-examined briefly today and there are a number of documents tendered into evidence; seven in the case of the independent children’s lawyer and two on behalf of Ms Dean. The documents tendered by Ms Dean make it clear that she has engaged with a counsellor [R] by the name of Ms J and has attended a number of appointments with that counsellor, although there have been a number of missed appointment. This is so notwithstanding criticisms with some validly that she has not, in the past, taken up services available for her assistance. I accept from Ms Dean’s evidence that this has perhaps related, to a large extent, to child-minding difficulties and that this has been the cause of a number of difficulties in attending appointments or accessing services. Exhibit ICL1 is a useful and comprehensive summary of allegations of domestic violence and criminal behaviour of Mr Miller and which are corroborated by reference to tendered documents ICL2 being COPS event entries from the New South Wales Police. The four page summary of assaults, by the father, Mr Miller, commencing in 2002, and against Ms Dean and members of his family are extensive and disturbing. The assaults include assaults by him upon his parents and each of them, Ms Dean, his brother, the police and strangers. There are also events in relation to assaults by Mr Miller’s brother, Mr M, including sexual assaults upon minors. Similarly, these are concerns which one can infer Ms Thompson is aware of as she has referred to them in interviews with the report writer Ms C. Ms Thompson is reported as remarking that Mr M, then on the run from New South Wales Police and resident in Queensland, has “been in some trouble in Queensland.” That no doubt relates to the two allegations of sexual assault upon minors that are levelled against him and for which he is still sought to be questioned in Queensland. There were also other matters that have caused Mr Miller to come to the Queensland justice system’s attention in relation to breaching bail, although it is unclear what he was on bail for, and convictions in relation to threats to cause serious harm, possessing dangerous drugs, possessing utensils and using a telecommunications device to make threats. They are very consistent with his New South Wales criminal record wherein he has charges and convictions in relation to assault, menacing driving, damaging property, contravening domestic violence orders, stalking and intimidating and the like. In relation to the evidence overall, the criticisms that are largely made of Ms Dean are long on allegation and short on evidence. Whilst these are proceedings to which Division 12A of Part VII applies, and accordingly s.69ZT makes clear that certain aspects of the Evidence Act 1995 do not apply to these proceedings, including provisions dealing with hearsay evidence, the evidence that is sought to be led – and using that term in its loosest sense – by Ms Thompson in relation to her concerns and criticisms of Ms Dean would, but for such non-application, be excluded. Section 69ZT though does not as a blanket allow the introduction of hearsay or opinion evidence nor does it in a blanket fashion allow it in. Sub-s(2) of the section provides that the Court can give such weight as it thinks proper to evidence that is admitted through the non-application of the specified parts of the Evidence Act 1995 and the Court is otherwise left, by sub-s(3) with a discretion to apply the Rules of Evidence as strictly as they consider appropriate in the circumstances. This is a case in which the hearsay and opinion evidence and conjecture is sought to be relied upon as the basis for removing two young children, four and not yet three, from the care of their Aboriginal mother and to place them into the care of their non-parent Caucasian paternal grandparents. In those circumstances I am perfectly and entirely satisfied that the exception in sub-s(3) applies and that the Rules of Evidence can and should be properly and fully applied. Indeed, the probative value of the evidence that is led as the basis of criticism of Ms Dean is, in most respects, so lacking that to rely upon it to make any decision of any importance would be a miscarriage of justice and the mis-exercise of discretion by this Court. There are already enough children removed from their parents and in which indigenous Australians are historically and continually over-represented that I would not be prepared to take any step of the nature suggested by the application of Ms Thompson, now discontinued, without probative evidence strictly in compliance with the Evidence Act. The Rules of Evidence have been developed since Magna Carta and they have developed for good reason. Initially, within the relevant provisions of Magna Carta, rules of evidence were intended to protect citizens from false accusation and false imprisonment. Freeborn John Lilburne continued that development in the 1640s so as to ensure that all litigants are entitled to face their accusers, to know the case that they are to answer and to test evidence that is put before the Court. Magna Carta, some 800 years ago, made clear that hearsay evidence cannot and should not be relied upon in any process. There are good reasons. The consequences of relying upon it in making a decision which profoundly impacts, in this case not only upon Ms Dean, but two children, are far more severe than the consequences of excluding evidence which is not in proper form. It is not undertaken to exclude evidence of that nature for the sake of it, but for the sake of delivering justice and equity, and in this case I am satisfied that it must be so. Further, the absence of corroboration of any of the allegations must, in my mind and in this case, give rise to a Jones & Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 inference against accepting that evidence or its truth. It is suggested in relation to a number of reports given by neighbours, allegedly regarding Ms Dean, that they are too afraid to be on affidavit. That may have some validity but there is nothing at all to otherwise specify or particularise the criticism. Similarly, the allegations that are made in relation to reports to the Department of Community Services, as they then were, and the New South Wales Police of attendances at and observations by those officers of the mother, the children and her household, are not before this Court, and accordingly I am not satisfied should be accepted.": Thompson & Dean & Anor [2011] FMCAFam 1074, [17]-[34].
> "The family report writer seems to identify the obligation to pay the private school fees of attending A Primary School as contributing to an increase in conflict rather than a reduction in it. The identification of this factor seems not to have been stated by either party but rather was one which the author supposed would occur. Another point of view is that the applicant is prepared to incur annual fees of educating the Child at a private school because he considers that education to be in the Child’s best interests. While the considerations raised by the family report writer are relevant, and I have considered them, they are not determinative and the whole of the case must be assessed.": Licata & Buxton [2019] FCCA 3181, [148]-[149].
Expert evidence:
> "Substantial weight must be afforded to the evidence of an expert, suitably qualified and based on an appropriate foundation. Departure from such evidence requires careful consideration, however the ultimate decision must be that of the trial judge.[382] [382] Muldoon & Carlyle (2012) FLC 93-513 at 86,576 [105].": Khatri & Khatri [2024] FCWA 35, [286].
> "The wife sought to rely upon two medical reports prepared by Dr U, a general practitioner. The reports are in relation to the wife, not Mr P, but the reports refer to Mr P having a disability. While the husband concedes that Dr U is the family general practitioner and that Mr P may have attended upon him from time to time, it is not apparent to me, on reading the reports, that Dr U has ever examined Mr P for the purposes of assessing whether he has a disability. The difficulty I have with the reports is that it is not clear, from the way the reports are prepared (notwithstanding the extravagant language used, which borders on advocacy), whether the source of Dr U’s knowledge of Mr P’s asserted disability is because he was told something by the wife or is a consequence of an assessment of Mr P undertaken by him. Consequently, notwithstanding that an application for adult child maintenance falls within Division VII of the Act, and the rules of hearsay and opinion evidence do not apply, I place little, if any, weight on the opinions of Dr U.": Eccheli & Eccheli [2024] FedCFamC1F 234, [72].
> "On consideration, I placed little weight on the evidence of Dr L. She provides therapy to the mother rather than a forensic assessment. She accepts the mother’s version of history without challenge or corroboration. She has not interviewed the father.": Wrenley & Wrenley [2023] FedCFamC1F 979, [79].
> "[249] The Wife sought to rely on a report of Ms O, psychologist dated August 2022. The Wife told Ms O that the Husband was financially and psychologically abusive and controlling, manipulating and scheming and unsupportive and threatening. Ms O has never met the Husband. Accordingly, her assessment of the Husband is based on the information provided by the Wife. [250] I note further that Ms O recorded that the Husband “wouldn’t allow [the Wife] to put anything financial in her name”. That is obviously inaccurate, as the house is in the Wife’s name, she had shares in her name and she had bank accounts in her name, from which the Husband was excluded. If that is what the Wife reported to Ms O, she has been misled. In her oral evidence the Wife also advised that Ms O had provided a draft of her letter to the Wife, which the Wife amended, before Ms O provided the final copy. Ms O was not on affidavit. In all those circumstances I put no weight on that report. [251] Having heard evidence from both of the parties, as indicated, I found the Husband to be a convincing and compelling witness. He denied all allegations of abuse and control. He denied being an unsupportive Husband, or that he had extra-marital affairs. He said he encouraged the Wife to undertake her studies, and that he was an engaged and loving father, doing the best he could, working long hours and then assisting the mother with the children in the evenings and providing care for them on weekends and holidays. He denied excluding the Wife from his financial affairs, and said she was involved in establishing the family trust and attended meetings with the accountant. He said she had access to all accounts and statements, save for the business accounts, which he has provided to her over the course of these proceedings. Conversely, the Wife managed her own income and accounts to the exclusion of the Husband. [252] The Husband seemed exhausted by the ongoing and unnecessarily drawn out legal proceedings, and the Wife’s attempts to further delay any financial settlement. Despite the provocative manner in which the Wife sometimes addressed him in Court, he generally remained calm and considered in his responses. From around 2014, the Husband regarded the marriage as over, and sought to extricate himself from it. The Wife interpreted his emotional and financial withdrawal from her as abusive and distressing and described it as such to her treating practitioners. Certainly the parties arguments included quarrelling over money, and how they spent their time. But I do not accept the Wife’s assertions regarding coercive controlling behaviour, psychological abuse or violence. ...": Bruil & Bruil [2023] FedCFamC1F 316.
Lay opinion about medical or public health, academic papers where authors not available for cross-examination: "The weight which can be given to the medical or public health opinions of witnesses, such as the parties, who have no qualifications or expertise in those areas, and to pamphlets or articles tendered on these topics, is discussed further below. ... In McGregor, at [77], the Full Court also noted that whilst s 67ZT made the hearsay representations contained in academic papers admissible that “…untested previous representations in a document may be given little weight” ... The strict application of the Evidence Act is moderated by Division 12A to provide greater flexibility to the Court when considering what is in the best interests of children. However, the decision making process still requires a rational assessment of the relative weight of the different items of evidence. Pursuant to s 69ZT(2) the court is to give “such weight (if any) as it thinks fit to evidence admitted as a consequence of a provision of the Evidence Act not applying because of subsection (1).” In considering the weight to be given to the parties’ evidence concerning COVID-19 infections and vaccinations, including the pamphlets, I note that this evidence would have been excluded by both the hearsay and opinion rule. The parties are not medical or public health experts. They are repeating and summarising what other bodies have said about complex medical and public health issues. In the absence of any relevant qualifications of either party to give opinion evidence about this complex issue I do not consider it appropriate to give any weight to either of their opinions on the medical and public health issues associated with COVID-19 infection or vaccination. Similarly, to the extent the mother gave her opinion about medical, psychological and contagion risks specific to the child, she has no expertise to give that evidence on complex medical issues. For the same reasons expressed immediately above I do not consider it appropriate to give any weight to the mother’s opinion evidence on these complex medical issues. These are, of course, issues on which the child’s treating general practitioner or psychologist, or similarly qualified experts, could have given evidence. Noting what was said in McGregor, about reliance on articles, and that the authors of the pamphlets were not available to be cross examined, I also give no weight to the pamphlets tendered by the mother. On the other hand, I give substantial weight to the unchallenged and uncontested evidence of Dr E who is a highly qualified expert. Those opinion were admissible pursuant to s.79 Evidence Act and who provided a summary of the relative risks of COVID-19 vaccination as against COVID-19 for children 5-11. Further, as noted, the father did not take issue with her evidence to the extent to which she gave it. His concern was with the fact that her opinion does not address the possibility of presently unknown risks arising in the future.The mother says that the child has a history of mild respiratory disease, which she believed would put him at an increased risk of harm as a result of his contracting COVID-19. However, the issue of whether the child is particularly susceptible to harm from catching COVID-19 by reason of his medical history is an issue on which medical opinion evidence would be required, and accordingly, as discussed above, I give no weight to this issue. The mother says that the child has suffered anxiety as a consequence of the extended lockdown last year. The father said in oral submissions that there were a variety of issues involved and that the child’s anxiety commenced when he saw television images of a person falling from a plane during the evacuation at the fall of Country G. The mother’s evidence does not on its face establish that the child has any current psychological symptoms that have not been treated, nor that it is the absence of COVID-19 vaccination that is causing or contributing to any such problems as opposed to lockdowns and other restrictions. There is no material from the child’s treating general practitioner or treating psychologist and no evidence that being vaccinated will assist to reduce any current anxiety he may have. The mother suggested that the fact that the child lives with a medical practitioner who deals with COVID-19 patients was a factor suggesting that the child is potentially exposed to a higher risk of contracting the disease, and similarly that his being unvaccinated increases the risks to the young children he lives with. Given the high level of care that one anticipates the mother’s partner would take in that context, and the extent to which COVID-19 is now in the community, it is not clear to me that it is open to draw that inference from this fact alone and I give no weight to the mother’s opinion on that medical issue. Again, these are issues on which the child’s general practitioner might have given admissible opinion evidence. There is no evidence the child is currently suffering from any social exclusion due to his not having had the COVID-19 vaccination. There is evidence that due to the mother’s views about the risks the child poses to others she sees as vulnerable, including the maternal grandparents, may effectively reduce the child’s capacity to spend time with his grandparents and other people. I accept that this may not be in the child’s best interests and that vaccination may impact on this. I do not give significant weight to his factor in the context of all of the evidence. I do take into account the child’s individual features, however, the issues raised by the mother are not in my view factors of any significant weight to be taken into account in determining what is in the child’s best interests. That is particularly so in the context of Dr E’s opinion evidence to which I give significant weight. ... I understand the father’s concern that the Pfizer COVID-19 vaccination for children is comparatively new. We do not have the history of decades of use that exist for the standard childhood vaccinations. However, there is no material before me to assist in determining what weight to give to that possible future unknown. I can only take it into account in a general way as a possible risk.": Palange & Kalhoun [2022] FedCFamC2F 149, [56], [104], [106]-[113], [124]-[129], [140].
Evidence of Children - s 69ZV(2): "Subsection 69ZT(2) of the Family Law Act proceeds on the basis that the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act do not apply. Thus, on a literal reading of s 69ZV(1) of the Family Law Act, the section could never apply as the court does not apply the law against hearsay under that section. That is an irrational result. However, if the reference in s 69ZV(1) of the Family Law Act to subsection 69ZT(2) is read as being a reference to subsection 69ZT(3) instead, the balance of s 69ZV would be capable of application. This is because it is under subsection 69ZT(3) that the hearsay rules – that is to say, the provisions of Part 3.2 of the Evidence Act – are applied to parenting proceedings. We consider that the reference to s 69ZT(2) of the Family Law Act is therefore erroneous and that the legislation intended s 69ZV(1) to refer to s 69ZT(3), and should be read in that way. Such an approach is consistent with authorities that require courts, at times, to look at the logic behind the sections and not simply apply them literally. ... The interpretation we propose is a realistic solution to give effect to the clear intention of the legislature which otherwise would be frustrated by a minor drafting error. It is also consistent with the purpose of the section envisaged by Parliament in the Revised Explanatory Memorandum to the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth): 12. While the effect of 69ZV is that, in many cases, rules of evidence including the hearsay rule would not apply in child-related proceedings, section 69ZV is necessary to those exceptional cases where a court considers that it is necessary to apply rules of evidence. In those cases, the rules related to hearsay will still not be relevant in relation to evidence of representations made by a child. This provision is particularly relevant for the role of independent children’s lawyers. (Emphasis added) Thus, s 69ZV(2) of the Family Law Act applies to the statement of TT and the trial judge was not in error in admitting it into evidence as evidence of the truth of the representations contained in it. The trial judge noted this, saying: 566. In relation to the evidence of what was said by [TT] to South Australia police the provisions of s 69ZV(2) of the Family Law Act permit the statement to become evidence in the case. The question of weight still needs to be considered as required by s 69ZV(3). This consideration does not apply to the statement of Mr XX. It follows that the trial judge erred in admitting his statement as evidence of the truth of the assertions made in it.": Duarte & Anor & Morse [2019] FamCAFC 93, [171]-[175], [179]-[182].
Family Report - "magic":
> "[198] As was said a long time ago, “there is no magic in a family report” (Hall and Hall (1979) FLC 90-713 at p.78,819 (“Hall and Hall”)). Family reports are important pieces of evidence, but report writers are not the adjudicators of disputes, and their recommendations cannot control the outcome; as the Full Court observed in Klein [2010] FamCAFC 150 at [241] referring back to Hall and Hall: …we simply observe that the family consultant is ordinarily an expert witness whose task is to assist and advise the court.The function of the family consultant is not that of an adjudicator. The family consultant brings to bear an entirely different expertise and experience from that of a lawyer or perhaps investigator. The family consultant may, as an expert, express an opinion on the ultimate issue; see s80 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). However, as the Full Court made clear in Hall and Hall (1979) FLC 90-713 at p 78,819: there should never be any suggestion that the counsellor is usurping the role of the court or that the judge is abdicating his responsibilities. [199] Further, unlike the CCE, I have had the benefit of assessing all the evidence and have watched the parties in cross-examination. [200] I found the CCE’s opinions about the needs of a neurodiverse child to be very helpful, along with the possible impacts on the mother as the residential parent of a neurodiverse child without her parents’ support.": Briedis & Saar [2025] FedCFamC1F 91.
> "[8] However, there is “no magic” in a family report and no judge is bound to accept the recommendations within it. Whilst the opinions given by a report writer constitute valuable and relevant material which assists the Court in reaching its determination, the Court is required to consider and give appropriate weight to all the evidence. A family report is but one piece of evidence which the Court considers in reaching its determination.1 However, the decision not to follow the recommendations of an expert requires some explanation and demonstration that the matters raised have been taken into account.5.2": Gulcan & Petroni [2024] FedCFamC2F 1314.
[B] Findings made on no Evidence - Error converts from Factual to Legal
"46. There was no evidence at all to find the wife’s mother now asserts some form of legal or equitable interest in the wife’s Singaporean assets, in which case the error converts from factual to legal (Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 355–356; Australian Gas Light Co v Valuer-General (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 126 at 137–138).": Adams & Marchenko [2025] FedCFamC1A 197.
[C] Failure to Consider Evidence - Adequacy of Reasons
"31. The second element of Ground 1 was articulated as a failure by the primary judge to “balance” the unchallenged factual conclusions against the specific pieces of other evidence which, the appellant claimed, showed the respondent had a significant history of not following medical advice that had been given to her in relation to her own personal treatment, and on occasions, not followed medical advice provided to the respondent in respect of the child. 32. This is an argument that the primary judge did not “properly” consider relevant evidence, which amounts to a challenge to weight and is thus difficult to sustain. Any lack of “proper” consideration can only constitute error if it rises to the level of a failure to consider at all (Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571 at [53]; Hedlund & Hedlund [2021] FedCFamC1A 84; (2021) FLC 94-065 (“Hedlund”) at [36]–[37] and [64]–[65]) or brings about a result that was unreasonable or plainly wrong (George & George [2024] FedCFamC1A 15; (2024) FLC 94-170 at [42]; Quintana & Konigsmann [2025] FedCFamC1A 30 at [74]; Xin & Qinlang (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 132 at [17]). Since we are satisfied the primary judge did consider the evidence, and the appellant did not contend the outcome was unreasonable or plainly wrong, this argument cannot succeed. 33. The third element of this ground was expressed as a failure to provide adequate reasons, “why, in light of the asserted failure of the [respondent] to follow medical advice, [the primary judge] still thought the [respondent] was the best person to have sole decision-making in relation to health”. In oral argument, the appellant focused upon this as the main point raised by Ground 1. 34. The primary judge was not required to give reasons regarding every argument, nor to perform a microscopic analysis of every piece of evidence if, reading the judgment as a whole, we are satisfied her Honour considered and evaluated the relevant evidence and the parties are able to identify the basis of the decision, and the extent to which their arguments have been understood and accepted (Candle & Falkner [2021] FedCFamC1A 102; (2021) FLC 94-069 at [97]–[98]). Adequate reasons do not require a minute explanation of every step in the reasoning process or reasons for individual findings which underpin the ultimate exercise of discretion (Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 at 259; DL v The Queen [2018] HCA 26; (2018) 266 CLR 1 at [33]; Shinohara & Shinohara [2025] FedCFamC1A 126 at [49]). 35. As already pointed out above, the primary judge gave ample reasons explaining why she had concluded the respondent should have sole decision-making in relation to health. The appellant does not challenge the findings about which parent, namely the respondent, had the clearer focus on the best interests of the child, particularly in relation to health. These findings are sufficient to support her Honour’s conclusion that the respondent should have sole responsibility for decisions about major long-term health issues.": Asturias & Nasir [2025] FedCFamC1A 187.